Table of Contents
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I – 4
- II. RUSSIAN “ACTIVE MEASURES” SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN – 14
- A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency – 15
- B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin – 16
- C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections – 19
- 1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As – 2014 – 19
- 2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts – 22
- 3. U.S. Operations Through Facebook – 24
- 4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter – 26
- a. Individualized Accounts – 26
- b. IRA Botnet – 28
- 5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies – 29
- 6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. – 31
- 7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign – 33
- a. Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political – 33
- b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies – 35
- III. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS – 36
- A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign – 36
- 1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign – 36
- 2. Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks – 38
- a. Initial Access – 38
- b. Implantation of Malware on DCCC and DNC Networks – 38
- c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks – 40
- B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials – 41
- I. DCLeaks – 41
- 2. Guccifer-2. – 42
- 3. Use of WikiLeaks – 44
- a. WikiLeaks ‘s Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign – 44
- c. The GRU ‘ s Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks – 45
- d.· WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials – 48
- C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations – 49
- 1. Summer and Fall-2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims – 49
- 2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections – 50
- D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials- 51
- 1. Harm to Ongoing Matter – 51
- a. Background – 51
- b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks – 52
- c. Harm to Ongoing Matter – 54
- d. WikiLeaks ‘ s October – 7,-2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails – 58
- e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks – 59
- 2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials – 61
- a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg) – 61
- b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton – 62
- 1. Harm to Ongoing Matter – 51
- A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign – 36
- IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS TO AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN – 66
- A. Campaign Period (September-2015 – November – 8,-2016) – 66
- 1. Trump Tower Moscow Project – 67
- a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014) – 67
- b. Communications with LC. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall-2015) – 69
- c. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October-2015-January-2016) – 70
- i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization – 70
- ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia – 72
- d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump (December-2015-June-2016) – 76
- i. Sater ‘ s Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia – 76
- ii. Candidate Trump’s Opportunities to Travel to Russia – 78
- 2. George Papadopoulos – 80
- a. Origins of Campaign Work – 81
- b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts – 82
- c. March – 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting – 85
- d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has “Dirt” in the Form of Clinton Emails – 86
- e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign – 89
- f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of “Dirt” – 93
- g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact – 94
- 3. Carter Page – 95
- a. Background – 96
- b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work – 97
- c. Carter Page’s July-2016 Trip To Moscow – 98
- d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign – 102
- 4. Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest – 103
- a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign – 103
- b. National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel – 105
- c. Jeff Sessions’s Post – Speech Interactions with CNI . – 107
- d. Jared Kushner’ s Continuing Contacts with Simes – 108
- 5. June – 9,-2016 Meeting at Trump Tower – 110
- a. Setting Up the June – 9 Meeting – 110
- i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr – 110
- ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the – 114
- b. The Events of June 9,-2016 – 116
- i. Arrangements for the Meeting – 116
- ii. Conduct of the Meeting – 117
- c. Post-June – 9 Events – 120
- a. Setting Up the June – 9 Meeting – 110
- 6. Events at the Republican National Convention – 123
- a. Ambassador Kislyak’s Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. Gordon the Week of the RNC . – 123
- b. Change to Republican Party Platform – 124
- 7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak – 127
- a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador’s Residence – 127
- b. Senator Sessions’s September-2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak – 127
- 8. Paul Manafort – 129
- a. Paul Manafort’ s Ties to Russia and Ukraine – 131
- i. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work – 131
- ii. Political Consulting Work – 132
- iii. Konstantin Kilimnik . – 132
- b. Contacts during Paul Manafort’s Time with the Trump Campaign – 134
- i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign – 134
- ii. Paul Manafort’s Campaign-Period Contacts – 135
- iii. Paul Manafort’s Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik in the United States – 138
- c. Post-Resignation Activities – 141
- a. Paul Manafort’ s Ties to Russia and Ukraine – 131
- 1. Trump Tower Moscow Project – 67
- B. Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts – 144
- 1. Immediate Post-Election Activity – 144
- a. Outreach from the Russian Government – 145
- b. High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels – 146
- 2. Kirill Dmitriev’s Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration – 147
- a. Background – 147
- b. Kirill Dmitriev’s Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming Administration – 149
- c. Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles – 151
- i. George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev – 151
- ii. The Seychelles Meetings – 153
- iii. Erik Prince’s Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip – 155
- d. Kirill Dmitriev’s Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U.S.- Russia Relations – 156
- 3. Ambassador Kislyak’s Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in Trump Tower Following the Election – 159
- 4. Jared Kushner’ s Meeting with Sergey Gorkov – 161
- 5. Petr Aven’ s Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team – 163
- 6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich – 166
- 7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn – 167
- a. United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements – 167
- b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia – 168
- 1. Immediate Post-Election Activity – 144
- A. Campaign Period (September-2015 – November – 8,-2016) – 66
- V. PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS – 174
- A. Russian “Active Measures” Social Media Campaign – 174
- B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations – 175
- 1. Section – 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy – 175
- a. Background – 175
- b. Charging Decision As to HARM. – 176
- 2. Potential Section – 1030 Violation By HARM. – 179
- 1. Section – 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy – 175
- C. Russian Government Outreach and Contacts – 180
- 1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion – 180
- 2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and – 18 U.S.C. § – 951). – 181
- a. Governing Law – 181
- b. Application – 182
- 3. Campaign Finance – 183
- a. Overview Of Governing Law . – 184
- b. Application to June – 9 Trump Tower Meeting – 185
- i. Thing-of -Value Element – 186
- ii. Willfulness – 187
- iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information – 188
- c. Application to WikiLeaks – 1 – 189
- ii. Willfulness – 190
- iii. Constitutional Considerations – 190
- iv. Analysis – 190
- 4. False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation – 191
- a. Overview Of Governing Law – 191
- b. Application to Certain Individuals – 192
- i. George Papadopoulos – 192
- ii HARM. – 194
- iii. Michael Flynn – 194\
- iv. Michael Cohen – 195
- v. HARM – 196
- vi. Jeff Sessions – 197
- vii. Other s Interviewed During the Investigation ……… – 198
This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which states that , “[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel ‘ s work, he … shall provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special Counsel] reached.”
The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in a sweeping and systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016. In June, the Democratic National Committee and its cyber response team publicly announced that Russian hackers had compromised its computer network. Releases of hacked materials-hacks that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government-began that same month. Additional releases followed in July through the organization WikiLeaks, with further releases in October and November.
In late July 2016, soon after WikiLeaks’s first release of stolen documents, a foreign government contacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. That information prompted the FBI on July 31, 2016, to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the Trump Campaign were coordinating with the Russian government in its interference activities.
That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian government “directed recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including US political organizations,” and , ” [t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election process.” After the election, in late December 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election. By early 2017, several congressional committees were examining Russia’s interference in the election.
Within the Executive Branch, these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May 2017 appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. The order appointing the Special Counsel authorized him to investigate “the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election ,” including any links or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.
As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel’s investigation established that Russia interfere~ in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations. First, a Russian entity carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second , a Russian intelligence service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities, employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents. The investigation also identified numerous links between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit
from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.
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Below we describe the evidentiary considerations underpinning statements about the results of our investigation and the Special Counsel’s charging decisions, and we then provide an overview of the two volumes of our report.
The report describes actions and events that the Special Counsel’s Office found to be supp01ted by the evidence collected in our investigation. In some instances, the report points out the absence of evidence or conflicts in the evidence about a particular fact or event. In other instances, when substantial, credible evidence enabled the Office to reach a conclusion with confidence, the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events occurred. A statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there was no evidence of those facts.
In evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multiple individuals constituted a crime, we applied the framework of conspiracy law, not the concept of “collusion.” In so doing, the Office recognized that the word “collud[e]” was used in communications with the Acting Attorney General confirming certain aspects of the investigation’s scope and that the term has frequently been invoked in public reporting about the investigation. But collusion is not a specific offense or theory of liability found in the United States Code, nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. For those reasons , the Office’s focus in analyzing questions of joint criminal liability was on conspiracy as defined in federal law. In connection with that analysis, we addressed the factual question whether members of the Trump Campaign “coordinat[ ed]”-a term that appears in the appointment order-with Russian election interference activities. Like collusion, “coordination” does not have a settled definition in federal criminal law. We understood coordination to require an agreement-tacit or express- between the Trump Campaign and the Russian government on election interference. That requires more than the two parties taking actions that were informed by or responsive to the other’s actions or interests. We applied the term coordination in that sense when stating in the report that the investigation did not establish that the Trump Campaign coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.
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The report on our investigation consists of two volumes:
Volume I describes the factual results of the Special Counsel’s investigation of Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election and its interactions with the Trump Campaign. Section I describes the scope of the investigation. Sections II and III describe the principal ways Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election . Section IV describes links between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Section V sets forth the Special Counsel’s charging decisions.
Volume II addresses the President’s actions towards the FBI’s investigation into Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the Special Counsel’s investigation. Volume II separately states its framework and the considerations that guided that investigation.
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